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British policy towards South Africa between the wars has been a matter of some historical 
debate. While those of the revisionist school have chosen to emphasise the capacity of South 
African power to be exerted northwards in search of new markets and spheres of inforrnal 
influence, the school of British imperial historiography has focussed upon the comparative 
failure of formal political annexation and the resilience of the doctrine of trusteeship. Both 
schools have tended to assume a certain cleavage between political and economic interests. 
For the revisionists, the failure of the political claims that were periodically made in the years 
after Union in 1910 for the incorporation of the High Commission territories of Botswana, 
Swaziland and Lesotho was comparatively marginal in comparison to the success of South 
African industrialists and mining capitalists to exert a hegemonic influence on the southern 
African sub-region [l]. Likewise, for Ronald Hyam, the most crucial factor was not so much 
British economic interests in the region dictating policy as a political fear and dislike of 
Afrikaner nationalist power in South Africa which, in the years after the election of the Pact 
government of 1924, led to continual resistance to South African claims for the BLS 
territories on the grounds of the doctrine of indefinite delay and the unripe time. [2] 
Certain crucial features within both British and South African policy, however, have been 
rather neglected in this historiographical discussion. The revisionists, surprisingly, have 
tended to overlook the political aspects of South AErican state policy towards the sub-region, 
though a model of an expansionist, conquest state rooted in a Milnerite and technocratic 
ideology has been outlined for the period before Union. [3] Hyam's focus upon the resistance 
by British policy-makers of South African claims for the BLS territories, on the other hand, 
is based upon a rather ahistorical depiction of the trusteeship doctrine, despite recent research 
which has tended to cast doubt upon the idea that, even by the late 1930s, it was premised 
upon the eventual withdrawal of the imperial power in favour of a Whiggish process of 
decolonisation. [4] As Kenneth Robinson pointed out as long ago as 1965, trusteeship in 
essence was in general reduced to only a very modest aim in British imperial policy, dictated 
by the limits of strategic preoccupations, economic pressures and "the reluctance to surrender 
power from which they were by means exempt, even if temperament and experience 
combined to give them a flexibility not often displayed by imperial rulers". [5] 
These factors prompt the consideration that historical analysis needs to focus less upon 
economic pressures divorced from state interest, or on a diplomatic record studied in a 
relative economic and political vacuum. The focus needs, indeed, to be more on the process 
of inter-state relations studied at a number of levels and goaded on by considerations of 
political statecraft. In the case of British-South African relations a Eurocentric model of 
diplomatic contacts cannot be simplistically applied, despite the pretensions of J C Smuts to 
play a strong role on the international and Commonwealth stage. It is true that a separate 
foreign policy arm of government began to be established in Pretoria with the Department of 
External Affairs in 1927, and throughout the 1930s South Africa maintained an independent 
presence at the League of Nations at Geneva. [6] However, in many respects, South Africa 
in the inter-war years was still a white minority post-colonial state seeking to legitimate itself 
in the international order and grateful, for the most part, for the protective umbrella of the 
Commonwealth during a period when it was entrenching a policy of territorial segregation 
domestically. As more recent research on post-colonial "third world" states suggests, 
internal ethnic cleavages invite the continual threat of external intervention and the first 
consideration of such states is to seek greater political security through regional diplomatic 
blocs. [7] For South Africa during this period the Commonwealth was clearly such a bloc, 
and Afrikaner nationalist isolationism, as espoused in the 1930s by Afrikaner nationalist 
politicians such as Eric Louw and D F Malan, was unlike its American counterpart in that it 
had no "open door" to fall back on and could only rest on an inward parochialism that 
disturbed a number of industrialists faced with the prospect of mounting tariff barriers to the 
export of South African goods. [g] 
Moreover, a prominent section of the South African political establishment was becoming 
attuned by the middle to late 1920s with the growing international unpopularity of ideologies 
of racial segregationism. It was clear that in informed British political circles there was some 
doubt as to whether the white rule in South Africa could survive. The Dean of St Paul's, 
W R Inge, for example, did not consider in 1921 that South Africa could ever be a "white 
man's country" like Canada and New Zealand, while in 1926 one speaker at the Royal 
Colonial Institute thought that the white population would eventually be so outnumbered by 
the country's black inhabitants that it would be forced to retreat to the coastal towns. [9] 
Such pessimism in conservative British circles indicated that the successive attempts of 
South African politicians since Union to employ segregationist ideology as a means of 
legitimating the future of "white South Africa" had by no means been entirely succesful even 
in potentially friendly circles in Britain. 
The response from some segregationists in South Africa was to try and link domestic "native 
policy" with British colonial policy to the north. P A Silburn, for example, suggested a 
Commission of both British and South African reprsentatives to outline a segregationist 
programme for the entire southern African region. To fail to initiate such a programme, he 
warned, would mean that South Africa's "racial future" would be like that of Mexico, Brazil 
and Haiti. [l01 
Such schemes had little chance of influencing British colonial policy for the region, however, 
once attention began to be concentrated after 1927 on attempting to initiate some 
development in the High Commission Territories. L S Amery at the Dominion Office sought 
to link such development with white settlement in order to increase their "British" nature 
before any possible inclusion in the Union. [ l  l] However, this policy did not appear to rule 
out the possibility of joint collaboration between the High Commission Territories, Southern 
Rhodesia and the Union and it was only opposition from within the DO which prevented 
further action on this front. The four Bills of J B M Hertzog in 1926, tabled in the South 
African House of Assembly, provided, among other things, for the eventual removal of the 
African voters in the Cape from the common roll. This undermining of the tradition of Cape 
liberalism, together with the controversy over the new South African flag, appeared sufficient 
grounds to some civil servants to avoid too close an entanglement with the Union's politics. 
Association with South African "native policy" would be at least "premature", B E H 
Clifford minuted to Amery in 1928, and "one must face facts and one very obvious fact is 
that the coloured and native community trust the policy of HMG towards them but are 
suspicious of the interests of the present government". [l21 
In such a situation, a more aggressive ideological offensive began to be mounted by some 
sections of the South African governing class in the late 1920s in order to try and transform 
British imperial thinking towards the Southern Afiican region and foster a more ambitious 
policy of white settlement. Chief among these was J C Smuts, out of power since 1924, and 
looking increasingly less likely even to some of his strongest supporters, such as B K Long, 
editor of The Cape Times, to regain it . [l31 But Smuts's connections with the Rhodes Trust 
and Round Table Lobby proved to be significant in the emerging debate on British imperial 
policy accompanying the passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act. They were, 
indeed, to exert some influence in transforming British views of South Africa as the imperial 
position came to seem more threatened with the rise of German and Japanese competition. 
The Attack on Trusteeship and "Paramountcy" 
Smuts's decision to mount an offensive against the trusteeship doctrine underpinning British 
colonial policy in Central and East Africa was partly stimulated by clear signals, following 
Amery's visit to South Africa in 1927, that British thinking was beginning to move towards a 
large bloc of Central and East African territories geared to an anti-Union counterpoise. [l41 
Smuts sought, in part, to try and pre-empt such a course by seeking to link it to an even wider 
grand design which would stretch from the Union all the way to Nairobi and even beyond. 
A receptive audience was to be found in the Rhodes Trust-Round Table circle, some of 
whose members, such as Lionel Curtis, had regretted in 1923 that Southern Rhodesia had 
voted to stay out of the Union. [l51 In the early 1920s the main link for the Round Table 
with South Africa had been via Abe Bailey, who had paid the election expenses for Edward 
Grigg to be elected as MP for Oldharn on a platform as a pro-Lloyd George Liberal. This link 
ended when Bailey had stopped his support with the election of the Pact in South Africa in 
1924 and had started trying to act as an intermediary figure with Hertzog. In 1925 Grigg was 
appointed, too, by Amery as governor of Kenya, and the Round Table began to look for 
alternative loci of political influence. 
In the wake of the 1926 imperial conference with the Balfour formula, it seemed to a number 
of Round Tablers that the dominion issue had been solved for the moment and the 
Hertzogites in South Africa silenced. Two important questions appeared to be looming for 
future Commonwealth policy: that of relations with the United States, where Canada would 
probably play an intermediary role, and the general issue of race relations, in which South 
Africa was expected to have a pivotal position. In some respects, the latter seemed the easier 
to tackle, given the strength of US isolationism, and it was by no means clear that Hertzog's 
four bills would ever reach the statute book. 1161 The issue seemed especially well disposed 
to being resolved through education and, with the prospect of Rhodes House being opened in 
Oxford the following year, the Round Table could possibly perform an important political 
function on this front. It could underline the ideal of the Commonwealth as a distinct cultural 
unity which was, Fred Clarke wrote to Reginald Coupland, a "really solid thing" (17). 
Thus Smuts found a receptive audience when he urged the creation of a wider bloc of white 
settlement, for there was the "danger in want of vision and too keen a preoccupation with the 
immediate difficulties, instead of looking ahead and trying to catch the greater vision of 
future development". The scheme, however, implied a counter attack against the critics of 
British colonial policy like Sydney Olivier, Norman Leys and McGregor Ross, for, Smuts 
claimed, there would be land enough for both black and white and "I am afraid that with the 
somewhat negrophilist temper which is about today, due regard will not be given to the larger 
points of view and to the necessity of keeping the widest door possible open to the future 
white settlement over all the highlands of South Africa". [l81 
Such sentiments underlined Smuts's lectures at Oxford in 1929, which were published in 
1930 as Africa and Some World Problems . [l91 The proposals for a massive scheme of 
effective biological and social engineering in Central and East Afiica to create a new white 
African race were, however, considerably out of tune with establishment opinion in Britain 
in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street Crash and defeat of the Conservative government of 
which Amery had been a member. [20] Even before the election it had been doubtful 
whether S tanley Baldwin, the Tory leader, would have reappointed Amery to the Colonial 
Office, as the latter's attempts to undermine the Devonshire doctrine of African paramountcy 
in East Africa had led to a considerable degree of political embarrassment . [21] The party's 
powerful pro-India lobby, in particular, was critical of Amery's continual pro-settler stand, 
and there was an emerging climate of opinion favourable to the idea of seeing tropical Africa 
as a source of raw materials and a growing market for British goods rather than for 
controversial and potentially troublesome schemes of white settlement. [22] 
These arguments were skillfully employed in criticism of Smuts's lectures by J H Oldham in 
White and Black in Africa: A Critical Examination of the Rhodes Lectures of General 
Smuts (1930) in which a more technocratic ideal was espoused, based upon capitalist 
industrialisation rather than the long-term project of creating a new white dominion. "The 
creative forces in the light of Africa at the present time", Oldham wrote, "are not limited to 
white settlement. They proceed from the insistent demand of the rest of the world for the 
products of the tropics. The economic forces set in motion by this demand are operative, and 
are clearly revolutionary changes, in vast areas where European settlement is impossible. 
What is needed is a comprehensive policy which will envisage the process as a whole." [23] 
Such arguments were geared to impressing mainstream "middle opinion" in British politics 
after a considerable period when the essentially moral critique of white settlement by the 
Leys, Olivier and McGregor Ross lobby had failed to make much headway even within the 
Labour Party (where they controlled the Advisory committee on Imperial Affairs), let alone 
with wider commercial and business opinion. C241 
Thus, it is by no means clear that the shift in informed British opinion against South African 
segregationist policy was as a result of the writings of Leonard Barnes, Sydney Olivier and 
Norman Leys, as Martin Chanock has suggested. [25] These writings fed into an emerging 
debate on the left in British politics, which would start to have a more significant political 
impact after World War Two, as well as into the more general debate on a "forward" policy 
in British colonial policy. [26] During the 193Os, however, British colonial policy still 
remained the preserve of a small coterie who were to a considerable degree insulated from 
domestic political pressure: it was quite possible for Colonial Secretaries to display a 
remarkable ignorance of their subject - such as Philip Cunliffe-Lister who was unaware in 
1932 that Bechuanaland was not part of the Union. [27] There was no very strong public 
awareness of the issues nor a large fund of humanitarian conscience to be tapped on lines 
similar to the nineteenth-century anti-slavery impulse. Thus, while D D T Jabavu wrote 
hopefully in 1932 that "an urgent task before Christian men and women in Great Britain is 
the creation and enforcement of a Christian public opinion on all matters connected with 
White and Black in South Africa" [28], in practice enormous organisational and political 
difficulties confronted the anti-settler lobby in the bleak years of the National Government. 
On the issue of forced labour in British colonial territories it was possible for the anti- 
imperial lobby, via organs like The New Leader, to make some headway, given the dislike 
of the Colonial Office for parliamentary difficulties from obstreperous Labour back- 
benchers. [29] But, on the more general question of opposing the drift in segregation policy 
in southern Africa, the lobby faced considerable difficulties throughout the 1930s, not least 
the fact that their allies in the region remained scattered and unable to unite in any common 
collective pressure group. [30] It also became clear as the decade progressed that potentially 
helpful opinion on the left was diverted into other issues concerning Japanese aggression in 
the Far East or the rise of fascism in Europe. The International African Service Bureau 
complained, when it came to the issue of South Africa' s renewed claims for the 
Protectorates, that these other issues "engage the attention of the British people to the 
exclusion of equally sinister tendencies within their Empire". [3 l] 
Thus British policy towards South Africa during the 1930s was dictated less by a response to 
the moral and ideological pressures from the small anti-imperial lobby than to the dictates of 
wider imperial strategy. While Smuts's more general ideological offensive against 
trusteeship in its Devonshire form had generally been seen to fail, given its rather antiquated 
relapse back to an older, Victorian style of imperialism, his plea for a reconsideration of 
imperial policy in Africa did not fall on deaf ears. Over the following years a reassessment 
did take place on two notable levels. Firstly, it led to a discussion, accompanying Hailey's 
Survey of African Affairs, on research into a more "scientific" African colonial policy in 
which the consideration of the ideological aspects of segregationism could, to a considerable 
degree, be downgraded. Secondly, it led to a reassessment of British defence arrangements 
with South Africa as British imperial security seemed increasingly threatened by Japanese 
naval power. In an atmosphere of mounting imperial crisis, the more hard-headed organs of 
government policy in both the Foreign Office and the Dominions Office began to usurp the 
position of the Colonial Office, which had had a somewhat marginal presence in the region 
once the BLS territories passed to the DO in 1925. It was in this context that the more 
general Foreign Office tradition of appeasement came into play: a policy that was essentially 
positive in that it sought the rational resolution of disputes through admitting and attempting 
to satisfy grievances rather than resorting to armed conflict. This had been, as Paul Kennedy 
has shown, a basic principle behind British policy since the era of Palmerston and was not to 
be thrown into disrepute until Munich in 1938. [32] 
The Hailey Survey and the Issue of the Protectorates 
Despite growing attacks on South African policy by the left in Britain in the early 1930s as 
an example of a counter-revolutionary offensive of mining and agicultural capital, some 
liberals still considered it a terrain for a successful resolution of what was seen essentially as 
a racial conflict between black and white. [33] This became evident in the debate that ensued 
in the wake of Smuts's 1929 Oxford lectures on the idea of more co-ordinated research on 
African issues. An initial meeting on "The African Problem" took place at Church House on 
21 September 1930, consisting of Philip Kerr, J H Oldham, D Ormsby-Gore and Sir Basil 
Blackett, with Baldwin in the chair. This led to a conference on Africa at Rhodes House on 
November 9th, where Smuts urged the creation of a school which would fulfil many of the 
ideas of Rhodes himself. [34] Curtis urged the continuation of a ruling race in Africa, for "it 
might indeed take three or four centuries under the white man before the black man has real 
civilisation". 1351 Oldham, despite his public criticism of Smuts's lectures, agreed with his 
"fundamental thesis" that the basic issues of African administration remained open and that 
there was a need for the analysing of race relations comparatively. In general, he took only a 
"modest view on the possibilities of negro development", but on the issue of general 
political agitation it was the white settlers in Kenya who were making all the claims" . [36] 
The line of discussion indicated that there were not such fundamental cleavages as might be 
imagined, and, when it came to the question of appointing someone to co-ordinate the 
proposal for a general survey of Africa, once again Smuts's indirect influence was apparent. 
Though the South African scholar W M Macmillan was undoubtedly well qualified, Curtis 
admitted to A M Carr Saunders, "had we given him the job we should have had at once hard 
against us the Union of South Africa and the settler element in East Africa". [37] The 
decision to appoint the Indian administrator Malcolm Hailey had the advantage of securing 
someone ostensibly neutral in the ideological debate on African political and economic 
development. However, it enabled Smuts to secure a tactical retreat from his position of 
1929 by calling, in Nairobi in August 1933, for the study of different African "native 
policies", to determine "on a purely objective scientific basis, apart from party prejudices, 
what policy would be best in the interests of both white and black". [38] 
The Hailey Survey contained an intellectual momentum which carried it some way beyond 
its original formulation towards a preoccupation with the scientific side of African colonial 
development. [39] The response from the Colonial Office was initially sceptical, since the 
focus of the research challenged the Office's departmental pattern of organisation. Some 
officials considered the scheme ill thought out, and there was a fear in some quarters of the 
Office that it would lead to "interference" with the CO ' S work in Africa. [40] However, 
there was sufficient prestige behind the research effort to lead to a generally cautious 
approach based on the trust that Hailey would exercise "discretion and discrimination in 
using the material prepared for him". [41] 
Some in the Round Table, such as Lionel Curtis, probably saw Hailey's Survey as 
contributing to the lobby's authority to pronounce on African issues, especially in the light of 
the renewal of the issue in 1933-34 of the tiansfer of the BLS territories. Curtis had been 
surprised, on returning from a visit to South Africa in 1933, at the strength of opposition to 
the transfer, though he considered it confined mostly to "religious circles and a very small 
minority of intellectuals". [42] In practice, many of those who were formally opposed to 
the transfer were resigned to the idea at this time that the handover of the BLS territories to 
the Union was more or less inevitable. [43] But, for Curtis, the issue confirmed his 
longstanding view that the solution lay in South African political jurisdiction from the Cape 
to the Zarnbesi. Another line of thinking within the work on the Survey, however, indicated 
that less formal political linkages would suffice. At a meeting addressed by Sir Alan Pim in 
June 1934 at Chatham House on the Protectorates issue, widespread support was given to the 
idea of British imperial trusteeship in the region. Margery Perham, especially, pointed out 
that there was a contradictory tension between humanitarianism and liberalism in British 
policy which had waivered "all the more for lack of power or of will to control the restless 
and complex situation" . [44] W M Macmillan added that Britain was guilty of the "sin of 
omission" in that it had "deferred taking a fm line against illiberal tendencies against South 
Africa". [45] 
In practice, Britain's potential to influence the situation decisively at the local level started to 
decline significantly in the years after South Africa abandoned the gold standard in 
December 1932 and started to engineer a new mining boom. Some officials within the 
British colonial administration in the BLS territories, such as Sir Charles Rey, the Resident 
Commissioner in Bechuanaland, remained fervent advocates of a British-led counterpoise as 
a means of at least neutralising if not smashing South African power. [46] But such figures 
were isolated exceptions in an otherwise generally indolent administrative apparatus that for 
the most part hid behind the doctrines of trusteeship and indirect rule as a means for 
having to initiate decisive new lines of policy. Even the Treasury could sympathise with 
such general policy guidelines, for, as one official minuted, "even if no such obligation [not 
to hand them over] existed, these places are inhabited by 'fighting' peoples of character who 
are capable of making trouble which might have considerable reverbations in Africa if they 
believed themselves ill treated" . [47] 
Such sentiments reflected, if only dimly, the fact that an articulate black opposition had been 
mounted to the possible transfer alongside the rather genteel debate between Lionel Curtis 
and Margery Perham in The Times. [48] Tshekedi Kharna, who had been a significant 
opponent of Rey's efforts to open up parts of Bechuanaland to South African mining 
operations in the early 1930s, mounted a strong attack on the whole idea, based upon the fact 
that South African "native policy" had clearly departed from the basic tenets of "indirect 
rule" with the strongly autocratic 1927 Native Administration Act. "Direct rule, the division 
of function between the two Departments of Native Affairs and of Justice; the extensive 
reliance upon police as agents of administration", he wrote, "have all militated against the 
training of personnel ready for the difficult and delicate task which is now set for them." [49] 
Such considerations underlined the ideal that the BLS territories might yet be what Lord 
Snell termed "laboratories in which to work out perfect institutions of a progressive native 
government". [50] They were probably of some importance when it came to the question of 
responding to Hertzog's renewed demand in 1935 for the transfer of the Territories. An aide 
memoire handed to Hertzog by the Dominions Secretary, J H Thomas, came near to 
accepting the idea that there was reasonableness in the South African claim and supported 
measures to encourage the "closest possible cooperation" between the BLS and Union 
administrations. Though there was some ambiguity in the British position, it was clear that 
transfer would still depend upon the consent of the inhabitants of the Territories. It also 
emerged over the following months that local administration would become very difficult if 
the British government were to agree to the transfer. E L Richards, the Resident 
Commissioner in Basutoland, for example, warned that any attempts to introduce soil erosion 
schemes in the territory would be jeopardized "if it were thought that it was being undertaken 
or assisted by the Union Government as a prelude to incorporation. The result would be ... 
that not only would the Basuto as a nation refuse to accept local assistance or to cooperate in 
the work so financed but they would actively or passively oppose or obstruct them". Several 
officials also resented their work possibly being subject to the "scrutiny" of officials of the 
South African Native Affairs Department with whom they felt little administrative 
compatibility. [5 l] 
By the end of 1937, therefore, the South African efforts to incorporate the Territories had 
been effectively rebuffed yet again, so underlining an ideological gap between British and 
Union "native policies" which was to become even clearer by the end of World War Two. 
To Curtis, the issue appeared to confirm the pressure of the "permanent officials" in the CO 
and the DO to retain their control and to reflect the fact that "people on this side of the world 
can do no more to improve the status of the South African natives than they can to improve 
the status of the American negro". [52] Likewise, for some South African liberals the issue 
appeared to indicate their progressive isolation from wider Commonwealth, and Alfred 
Hoernle wrote to W M Macmillan that he found British claims to the Territories based on 
Tshekedi's opposition a "most unedifiable verdict?'. [53] 
The Question of Imperial Defence 
Despite this failure, by the middle 1930s, South African political influence on British policy 
found its strongest card to play with the issue of defence. Even before the 1935-37 claim to 
the BLS territories, the DO was anxious to underline its commitment to the Commonwealth 
I rather than Europe. [54] In the wake of the 1932 Disarmament Conference the British 
Chiefs of Staff had begun pressing for a shift in defence policy away from the so-called Ten 
Years Rule, based upon the assumption that war would not occur within ten years of any 
particular date. Attention turned towards a more defensive imperial policy which would 
include bases such as that at Singapore. Such a commitment generally ran counter to any 
involvement in continental affairs, which had generally been opposed by the Dominions 
since the Locarno Treaties of 1925. There were considerable divisions within the Chiefs of 
Staff, but the Committee of Imperial Defence remained dominated by the figure of Hankey 
and the "blue water school" who favoured a reliance upon naval power, despite some 
evidence to the contrary suggesting the exposure of ships to aerial attack . [55] 
These considerations came into play by the time of Hankey's empire tour of 1934, which has 
on the whole been seen as confirming the general indifference of the Dominions in the broad 
theme of imperial defence, especially in regard to British power in the Far East. [S61 If the 
idea of "dominion defence" was really a mythical concept that could be used by ministers to 
buttress their arguments in cabinet, nevertheless it could be skilfully employed by Dominion 
ministers to manipulate British policy towards their own line of interest: employing the 
Commonwealth ideal to the point that it suited them without any firm commitments 
regarding future European entanglements. As Michael Howard has cogently pointed out, 
dominions such as South Africa and Canada "used their new and dearly bought membership 
of the international system to contract out of it". [57] 
The price that Britain paid, therefore, for securing at least nominal dominion support for the 
idea of a common imperial defence was some form of appeasement , and it was this which 
did so much to weaken its claims to act as a decisive imperial power in the sub-region. It 
was possible for small posturings to take place, such as the naval task force sent from the 
Cape to Bechuanaland in 1933 under Admiral Evans to depose Tshekedi Kharna for 
allegedly exceeding his powers. But, in reality, Britain was far less able to exert her 
influence in resisting Afrikaner power than Hyam has suggested. [59] Maurice Hankey's 
visit in September 1934 occurred at a time of some anxiety regarding the growth of Afrikaner 
nationalist isolationism, though the CID had been impressed in July by the apparent 
willingness of the Union Minister of Defence, Oswald Pirow, to engage in defence 
cooperation. "If somehing, however elementary, could be arranged", Hankey wrote to Sir 
Herbert Stanley, the British High Commissioner in Pretoria, "it would be an admirable 
example to other Dominions whose help would be really valuable." South Africa could, he 
felt, make a "real contribution" in both coastal defences around Cape Town and in aerial 
power, though "we cannot have anything said which would make either the settlers or 
Natives think that we were anxious in any way". [59] 
Hankey's visit confmed his view on the symbolic value of the navy as the cement binding 
imperial feeling, while at the same time he was anxious to promote Smuts's views on the 
value of Commonwealth defence arrangements. [60] The visit attracted considerable press 
attention in South Africa and Die Burger considered it "undoubtedly one of the most 
important and far reaching Empire missions since the Great War". [61] In practice, it was far 
more of a publicity exercise, though it underlined the view in the Chiefs of Staff that 
Simonstown was a critical naval base which might have great strategic value in the light of 
possible Italian or Japanese military aggression. [62] It gave a boost to Smuts's calls for 
closer cooperation between the British Commonwealth and the United States, which echoed 
similar sentiments in Round Table circles in Britain. [63] More particularly, it reinforced 
the standpoint of South Africa in the 1930s as one of the most prominent of dominions to 
support appeasement of Germany. 
The sources of this South African suppport for appeassment were complex, ranging from 
outright admiration for Nazi Germany amongst a small clique, led by Pirow and some of the 
more die-hard Afiikaner nationalists, to emulation by Smuts and Patrick Duncan of the 
Round Table style in Britain . [64] In a more general sense, however, the South African 
political class was divided on the issue, despite the fact that even the English-speaking 
members in the United Party government favoured neutrality until 1938. [65] In the event, 
the UP cabinet split by 7-6 favouring Smuts's support for war in September 1939, so 
indicating that at least part of the publicity and propaganda for the idea of imperial defence 
ultimately had some pay-off. But, in a more long run sense, there was a strategic calculus 
behind Smuts's position which was to become more evident during the course of the war 
itself as a fm political alliance was secured with the Churchill goverment based especially 
upon the centrality of the war in the Middle East. Smuts probably hoped such military 
successes as the Union forces secured in Madagascar and East Africa would reinforce 
renewed claims for the BLS territories, once hostilities were over. In this, however, he was 
misled as he failed to understand the tide of international opinion against both colonialism 
and racial segregation. The decade up to 1939 had given some credence for such a belief, as 
the policy of appeasement in Europe had in some degree spilled over into policy towards the 
dominions as well. With the collapse of this appeasement policy in 1938-39, a false dawn 
appeared to emerge for the Smuts political leadership, which was to be rudely shattered by 
the post-war international order after 1945. 
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